The “Supremacy of God”, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by Sossin, Lorne
THE “SUPREMACY OF GOD”, HUMAN DIGNITY 
AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Lome Sossin*
“Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy o f God 
and the rule o f law:” 1
I. Introduction
While the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms is now two decades old, and 
past its natural adolescence, we have yet to grapple with some of the most 
fundamental precepts, premises and principles which animate it. This essay is 
intended to explore two of these: the concept of human dignity, which does not 
appear in the Charter, and the concept of the supremacy of God, which are the first 
words to appear in the Charter.
Is human dignity a judicially cognizable concept? No evidence can prove or 
disprove its existence and no doctrinal test can precisely define its boundaries. It is 
a construction of personal conviction, individual belief, culture and social relations. 
As Oscar Schachter once observed,
references to human dignity are to be found in various resoultions and declarations 
o f international bodies. National constitutions and proclamations, especially those 
recently adopted, include the ideal or goal o f human dignity in their references to 
human rights. Political leaders, jurists and philosophers have increasingly alluded 
to the dignity o f the human person as a basic ideal so generally recognized so as to 
require no independant support. It has acquired a resonance that leads it to be 
invoked widely as a legal and moral ground for protest against degrading and 
abusive treatment. No other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a universal social 
good.2
It reflects, in short, a leap of faith. The Supreme Court has stated on several
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occasions that the Charter and the rights it guarantees are “inextricably bound” to 
“concepts of human dignity.”3 Human dignity, the Court has observed more broadly, 
is an underlying principle upon which our society is based.4 It is, however, nowhere 
to be found in the Charter. It is a judicial contrivance, albeit a welcome one. It is 
welcome because it hints at a moral infrastructure to the Charter, supporting and 
welding together the various freedoms, rights and obligations outlined in the 
Charter. Thus far, though, this moral infrastructure has lacked coherence and clarity. 
In other words, what the Charter needs is a more express and better justified moral 
architecture.
If human dignity represents the concept outside the actual terms of the Charter 
about which the Court has said the most, the reference in the Preamble of the 
Charter to the “supremacy of God” represents the actual term in the Charter about 
which the Court has said the least. The supremacy of God, like human dignity, is 
difficult to concieve as a justiciable concept. It cannot be substantiated nor can it be 
disproven. Unlike human dignity, however, the supremacy of God has not been the 
subject of creative judicial elaboration. Not even the most basic questions about its 
place and purpose in the Charter have been addressed. Whose God is supreme and 
supreme in what way? Are the supremacy of God and the rule of law intended to be 
complementary constitutional principles, or distinct? How can and should the 
supremacy of God be reconciled with the freedom of conscience and religion 
provisions under s. 2 of the Charter?
The argument I advance in this essay is as follows. The reference to the 
supremacy of God in the Charter's Preamble should be given meaning as an 
animating principle of constitutional interpretation, on par with the rule of law with 
which it is paired. To embrace the rule of law while abandoning the supremacy of 
God is to neglect the governing premise of the Charter. The supremacy of God, in 
turn, can only play a meaningful role in constitutional interpretation if it is taken as 
a general statement regarding the universal, normative aspirations of the Charter, 
rather than as a direction to privilege any one particular religious or spiritual 
perspective over another, or over those perspectives which deny the existence of God 
per se. The concept of human dignity represents a key normative aspiration of 
Charter jurisprudence. It has rarely been justified or elaborated, however, on 
normative terms. Rather, the Supreme Court has tended to treat its articulation of the 
scope and content of human dignity as an article of faith, simply to be invoked along 
the way to what the Court has deemed a just outcome of a Charter challenge. I argue 
that if the concept of human dignity was linked with the supremacy of God in the 
Charter's Preamble, it would be incumbent on courts to justify their claims 
regarding human dignity as a leap of faith, and a more coherent and robust 
elaboration of the Charter's moral architecture would result.
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II. Human Dignity as the Unity of Faith and Reason
Joel Bakan has observed, “constitutional argument may best be understood as a call 
to faith rather than persuasion by reason.”5 The Preamble to the Charter proposes 
that Canada was founded “upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and 
the rule of law”. It contains an explicit paradox by which our constitution recognizes 
both the sovereignty of God and of law.6
I suggest that the Preamble contains not so much a paradox as a “call to faith” 
regarding the nature of the Charter. The reference to the supremacy of God in the 
Charter should not be construed so as to suggest one religion is favoured over 
another in Canada, nor that monotheism is more desirable than polytheism, nor that 
the God-fearing are entitled to greater rights and privileges than atheists or agnostics. 
Any of these interpretations would be at odds with the purpose and orientation of the 
Charter, as well as with the specific provisions regarding freedom of religion and 
conscience under s. 2.7 Rather, I argue that the supremacy of God should be seen as 
a twin pillar to the “rule of law” -  as a moral complement to the descriptive 
protections and rights contained in the Charter. The concept of human dignity may 
serve to bridge these pillars and unite faith with reason in constitutional discourse. 
Because the Court’s articulation of human dignity has been disconnected from any 
appeal to moral authority, however, it has served as a shifting, ineffective, and often 
incoherent constitutional norm.
In Law v. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration), the Court offered 
the following articulation of human dignity as a constitutional norm in the context 
o f the equality analysis under s. 15 of the Charter.
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.
It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human 
dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances 
which do not relate to individual needs, capacities or merits. It is enhanced by laws 
which are sensitive to the needs, capacities and merits o f difference individuals, 
taking into account the context o f  their underlying differences. Human dignity is 
harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignited or devalued, and is 
enhanced when laws recognize the full place o f individuals and groups within 
Canadian society.8
While many may agree that human dignity ought to be a cornerstone of 
Canada’s system of justice, there is far less agreement as to what constitutes human
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dignity and what role it should play in constitutional interpretation. Does human 
dignity encompass only negative freedoms, such as the right not to have one’s bodily 
integrity or privacy violated or may it extend to positive freedoms, such as the right 
to adequate food, shelter, clothing, health care, legal assistance and education? The 
concept of human dignity is inherently subjective, informed by personal predilection, 
community values, religious doctrine, ethnic identity, gender, race, age and 
ideological conviction, just to scratch the surface. It is also expressly normative. 
Every attempt to describe its essence or apply it as a constitutional principle 
embodies a claim regarding morally good and socially just relations between 
individuals, groups and the state. In short, adopting a particular understanding of 
human dignity requires a leap of faith.
A review o f the major Supreme Court decisions featuring a discussion of human 
dignity and the Charter discloses that it has been invoked by the Court most often 
in six legal settings: psychological integrity; physical security; privacy; personal 
autonomy; professional reputation; and personal affiliation or group identity.9 What 
links together these concerns? In most of these categories, human dignity appears as 
a manifestation of the liberal, individual ethos -  in other words, human dignity is 
about what makes individuals unique and self-contained. The Court, however, does 
not justify its use of this concept on those or any terms. Human dignity appears to 
the Court as an organizing principle of Canadian society -  as the underpinning of 
what some observers have identified as “legal humanism.”10
If one looks at human dignity through the lens of the supremacy of God, a 
different set of claims regarding its content and scope may emerge. For example, if 
I take the supremacy of God to reflect the conviction that all people have equal 
moral worth, then human dignity is not just what separates us as individuals but also 
rather what binds us together as a community of mutual obligation. On this view of 
human dignity, it would be untenable to see the loss of professional reputation as an 
issue of human dignity, but not the right to a roof over your head, or food to feed 
your family, or adequate health care. Human dignity, if taken as a social as well as 
individual norm, renders untenable the sharp line between negative and positive 
constitutional liberties.
To illustrate the shortcoming of the present paradigm, consider the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in Gosselin v. Quebec.11 In this case, the Court 
considered, inter alia, whether the state owed a positive obligation of providing 
social welfare as a result of the right to life, liberty and the security of the person 
under s. 7 of the Charter. The majority concluded that no person had a right to 
welfare under the Charter. Earlier case law from the Court had left open the 
possibility of “economic rights fundamental to human... survival” being protected
9 This is drawn from a “human dignity database” of approximately 60 cases. This database is on file with 
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by the Charter.12 In Gosselin, the majority held that this section related at its core to 
protecting the individual in the administration of justice. While they did not close the 
door on recognizing positive obligations on the state in “special circumstances,” a 
duty on the government to ensure the economic survival of vulnerable citizens was, 
in the majority’s view, beyond the scope of the Charter.
Thus, the concept of human dignity has been harnessed thus far by the Court, as 
often to underscore the limitations of the Charter as to extend its grasp. There is no 
discussion of where human dignity comes from, except to say that it is 
“fundamental” and “essential” to the operation of the Charter. It is in precisely these 
circumstances, where the animating principles of a constitutional document are at 
issue, that a Preamble may take on special significance.
III. The Significance of the Charter's Preamble
Preambles serve as an important interpretive tool, but they do not have the force of 
law. For this reason, they enjoy uneven influence over courts in the interpretation of 
statutes. While not all preambles attract judicial attention or reflect legislative 
aspiration,13 it is fair to observe that Constitutional preambles often do. Indeed, the 
Preamble to the Constitution Act o f 1867, which establishes that Canada’s 
Constitution is “similar in principle” to that of the United Kingdom, has been the 
foundation for a variety o f judicial innovations from the “implied bill of rights” to 
“judicial independence”.14
Preambles are arguably even more significant when the object of a constitutional 
document is to protect rights and freedoms rather than apportion political and 
legislative authority. While God does not make an appearance in the preamble of the 
Constitution Act o f1867, the reference to the supremacy of God in the Canadian Bill 
o f Rights is instructive. It reads, in part:
The Parliament o f  Canada, affirming that the Canadian Nation is founded upon 
principles that acknowledge the supremacy o f God, the dignity and worth o f the 
human person and the position o f  the family in a society o f free men and free 
institutions...
The Preamble to the Bill of Rights goes on to assert that “men and institutions 
remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual 
values and the rule of law;.. .” Thus, the connection between human dignity and the 
supremacy of God, between moral and spiritual values on the one hand and the rule
12 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1003.
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14 See Marie D. Walters, ‘The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as 
Fundamental Law” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91.
of law on the other, which I suggest is implicit in the Charter, was set out explicitly 
in the Bill o f  Rights. Or, put differently, the conception of God as a constitutional 
concept in Canada is intimately bound up with our affirmation of the moral worth 
and inherent dignity of all people. As Polka has written: “The supremacy of God is 
not merely compatible with but fundamental to the rule of law, just as the rule of law 
(including the rule of lawful interpretation) is not merely compatible with but 
fundamental to conceiving of God as supreme.”15
IV. The Supremacy of God
Where did the “supremacy of God” come from and how did it find its way into the 
Charter? On the one hand, the provenance o f the term is an important issue. Its 
inclusion was advocated by religious groups and linked by those groups with a 
particular conservative social agenda (hostile to gay and lesbian rights, staunchly 
pro-life, etc.). This conservative agenda also had political overtones, as those who 
supported the amendment justified it as a bulwark against Soviet Union style 
atheistic tendencies. The term “supremacy of God” was inserted as an amendment 
to the Charter’s Preamble as a result of a motion late in the process made in the 
House of Commons by the Honourable Jake Epp, MP, in February, 1981. It was 
accepted by Prime Minister Trudeau (albeit, one must imagine, reluctantly). Thus, 
the first words of the Charter were more or less the last to be drafted.
Perhaps in part because of its inglorious origins, the “supremacy of God” 
reference in the Charter's preamble has been all but ignored by the Supreme Court,16 
and by most constitutional observers as well.17 David Brown observed that, 
“[although the Preamble suggests that all other rights and freedoms set out in the 
Charter are founded on these two principles, courts and academics have treated the 
Preamble, especially in its reference to the “supremacy of God,” as an 
embarrassment to be ignored.” Peter Hogg has referred to the Preamble as “of little 
assistance”. Dale Gibson maintains the view that “its value as an interpretative aid 
is seriously to be doubted.” The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently 
characterized the Preamble’s reference to the “supremacy of God” as a “dead 
letter.”18 Below, I briefly summarize the treatment of the Preamble by Canadian 
courts and commentators.
15 Brayton Polka, ‘The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and 
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Columbia Government Employees ’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, and Reference re: 
Manitoba Language Rights (Man.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
17 Supra note 15.
18 R. v. Sharpe, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1555 at paras. 78-80, per Justice Southin.
1) The Jurisprudence
At a conference some years ago, I asked a Supreme Court Justice about what he 
thought the supremacy of God’s role was in Charter analysis. He looked visibly 
uncomfortable. He stammered something about the importance of freedom of 
religion in s. 2 of the Charter and invited the next question as soon as he could. This 
seems to me to sum up the collective orientation of the Court. What can a secular 
Court in a multicultural society say about the supremacy of God except to look away 
and ask for the next question? And yet, how can the Court sidestep the principles on 
which rest the “supreme law” to which they are charged with giving life?
The one notable instance where the Supreme Court has opined on the meaning 
of the “supremacy of God” revealed a fairly one-dimensional approach to its 
meaning, focussing on the question of the primacy of Christian values in Canada’s 
legal order. The case was Big M  Drug,19 in which a drug store sought to have the 
Sunday closing provisions of the Lord’s Day Act struck down as offending the 
freedom of religion guaranteed under s. 2 of the Charter. A dissenting judge of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal had defended the legislation by recourse to, inter alia, the 
“supremacy of God” provision in the Preamble. About this, Chief Justice Dickson 
had the following to say:
Mr. Justice Belzil said it was realistic to recognize that the Canadian nation is part 
o f  “Western” or “European” civilization, moulded in and impressed with Christian 
values and traditions, and that these remain a strong constituent element in the basic 
fabric o f our society. The judge quoted a passage from The Oxford Companion to 
Law (1980) expatiating on the extent o f the influence o f  Christianity on our legal 
and social systems and then appears the cri du coeur central to the judgment at pp. 
663-64:
I do not believe that the political sponsors o f the Charter intended to confer 
upon the courts the task o f stripping away all vestiges o f those values and 
traditions, and the courts should be most loath to assume that role. With the 
Lord’s Day Act eliminated, will not all reference in the statutes to Christmas,
Easter, or Thanksgiving be next? What o f  the use o f  the Gregorian Calendar?
Such interpretation would make o f the Charter an instrument for the 
repression o f the majority at the instance o f  every dissident and result in an 
amorphous, rootless and godless nation contrary to the recognition o f the 
Supremacy o f God declared in the preamble. The “living tree” will wither if  
planted in sterilized soil.20
Ultimately Chief Justice Dickson declined to offer his own interpretation of the 
“supremacy of God” clause in the Charter's Preamble, although, of course, the 
impugned provision in the Lord’s Day Act was in fact struck down. Importantly, 
Big M  Drug was also the case in which the Court affirmed that the Charter was to
19 R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
20 Ibid. at paras. 30-31.
be given generous and liberal interpretation.
Later references by the Supreme Court to the Preamble have been to contrast the 
Preamble with substantive guarantees under s. 2 of the Charter. Take, for example, 
the judgment of Justice Wilson in R. v. Morgentaler,21 in which she observed that 
conscientious beliefs which are not religiously motivated enjoy the same 
constitutional protection under s. 2(a) of the Charter as those which may be 
religiously motivated. She then added, “In so saying I am not unmindful of the fact 
that the Charter opens with an affirmation that “Canada is founded upon principles 
that recognize the supremacy of God....” But I am also mindful that the values 
entrenched in the Charter are those which characterize a free and democratic 
society.”22 Justice Wilson offered no explanation for the apparent conflict between 
the supremacy of God on the one hand and the values of a free and democratic 
society on the other.23
Almost universally, and without serious inquiry, Canadian lower courts have 
equated the “supremacy of God” with a claim to religious orientations generally and 
Christian ones specifically. For example, in McBurney v. Canada (Minister o f 
National Revenue -  M.N.R.),24 Justice Muldoon referred to the support religious 
institutions receive from the state in the form of charitable deductions and concluded 
that:
[t]hose Canadians who profess atheism, agnosticism or the philosophy o f secularism 
are just as secure in their civil rights and freedoms as are those who profess religion.
So it is that while Canada may aptly be characterized as a secular State, yet, being 
declared by both Parliament and the Constitution to be founded upon principles 
which recognize “the supremacy o f God,” it cannot be said that our public policy is 
entirely neutral in terms o f “the advancement o f  religion.”25
Revealingly, tax litigation has been the most common forum for the “supremacy 
of God” to be discussed. To take another example, in O ’Sullivan v. Canada 
(Minister o f National Revenue-M.N.R.),16 the Federal Court dismissed a taxpayer’s 
claim to withhold $50 from his income tax return because such money might 
ultimately fund abortions. The taxpayer urged the Court to consider the “supremacy 
of God” clause in its analysis. The Federal Court responded by tracing the
21 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
22 Ibid. at para. 251.
23 The scholarly literature has often equated the two as well. William Klassen points out: "To mention 
God with a capital letter in the preamble to the Charter and then to go on to say that the Charter 
provides a fundamental freedom of conscience and religion, is a contradiction which even a theologian, 
to say nothing of all the lawyers, must surely recognize." William Klassen, "Religion and the Nation: 
An Ambiguous Alliance" (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 87 at 95.
24 [1984] C.T.C. 466.
25 Ibid. at 468-69.
26 [1992] 1 F.C.522.
importance of religion in the development of Canada and then offered the following 
conclusion:
[T]he late amendment to the Charter in 1981 cannot be construed to have converted 
Canada into a Roman Catholic theocracy, a Mennonite theocracy, an Anglican 
theocracy or a Jehovah’s W itnesses’ theocracy any more than Canada was thereby 
converted into an Islamic theocracy (whether Sunnite or Shiite), a Hindu theocracy, 
a Sikh theocracy, or a Buddhist theocracy.
What then is meant by this preamble? Obviously it is meant to accord security to all 
believers in God, no matter what their particular faith and no matter in what beastly 
manner they behave to others. In assuring that security to believers, this recognition 
o f the supremacy o f God means that, unless or until the Constitution be amended -  
the best o f  the alternatives imaginable -  Canada cannot become an officially 
atheistic State, as was the Union o f  Soviet Socialist Republics or as the Peoples’ 
Republic o f  China is understood to be.27
On this view, the significance of the “supremacy of God” provision is to 
preclude any official recognition of atheism by the state, but not to preclude the 
secular nature of the state. This narrow and literalistic approach does not seem in 
keeping with either the purpose or spirit of the Charter. Suffice it to say that, to date, 
Canadian courts have not brought the vigor to the elaboration of the supremacy of 
God that has been directed to enlarging concepts such as the rule of law.
2) The Commentary
While the dividing line between the sacred and the profane has rarely been an object 
of great interest among constitutional law scholars in Canada, it is fair to say that 
interest in this area is picking up as the Charter matures. This emerging literature, 
moreover, has been far more creative in approaching the Preamble than has the 
more literal-minded judiciary. For example, in his article, “Notes Towards a 
(Re)definition of the “Secular,””29 Iain Benson criticizes the use of “secular” by 
Canadian courts in relation to the Charter.
The term “secular” has come to mean a realm that is neutral or, more precisely, 
“religion-free.” Implicit in this religion free neutrality is the notion that the secular 
is a realm o f  facts distinct from the realm o f faith. This understanding, however, is 
in error. Parse historically the word “secular” and one finds that secular means 
something like non-sectarian or focused on this world, not “non-faith.” States cannot 
be neutral towards metaphysical claims. Their very inaction towards certain claims 
operates as an affirmation o f others. This realization o f  the faith-based nature o f all
27 Ibid. at paras. 17-18.
28 See also Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Department o f  Indian and 
Northern Affairs Development) (Re Prince), [ 1994] F.C.J. No. 1998.
29 (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519.
decisions will be important as the courts seek to give meaning to terms such as
secular in statutes written some time ago.30
In a similar vein, David Brown suggests the Preamble itself may help to 
reconcile the tension between the Charter's secular and sacred claims.What the 
Preamble instructs, according to Brown, is that “legal freedoms must be interpreted 
with humility stemming from man’s “creatureliness”, as well as with the objective 
of ensuring all human beings enjoy fundamental legal protection for their human 
dignity as creatures. The supremacy of God thus mandates that all humans be treated 
in accordance with the rule of law.”31 A similar view of the complementary nature 
of the supremacy of God and rule of law was espoused by David Crombie, then an 
MP, during the debate on the Preamble in 1981. He observed, “. . .when legal orders 
relate to spiritual principles, it allows for diversity and dissent. The roots of 
democratic dissent have always begun with religious dissent; laws imposed by 
government were always fought on the basis of an appeal to God.”32
If supremacy of God is seen as the place where normative claims about Charter 
rights take on moral legitimacy (again, the example I focus upon in this essay is the 
concept of human dignity), one might well question what remains of God at all in 
this analysis. Is not God, cleansed of religious particularity, simply the embodiment 
of general and metaphysical claims about the sources and scope of law? The answer, 
I think, is probably “yes”. Moreover, I would argue that this is precisely the reading 
of the term most compatible with the values of the Charter. Thus, ironically, the 
process of breathing life into the idea of the supremacy of God in the Charter may 
well alienate precisely those groups seeking the advancement of religion or religious 
agendas through the courts.
William Klassen concludes his analysis of the Preamble by suggesting that it 
would have been preferable to leave God out of the Charter altogether, and assert 
instead that Canada was founded on “transcendent principles” and the rule of law.33 
While inelegant, I agree that this more precisely captures the approach to 
interpreting the Preamble advocated in this essay. Precise language, however, is far 
from the norm in the Charter. Indeed, in its ambiguities have been found, arguably, 
its most expansive and progressive protections. To take but one example, consider 
the “principles of fundamental justice” under s. 7 of the Charter. The term had a 
largely uneventful history as an adjunct to the “fair hearing” right under s. 2(e) of 
the Bill o f Rights, and was selected by the drafters of the Charter, in large part, to
30 Ibid. at 520. Benson takes issue with Chief Justice Lamer’s characterization in his dissent in Rodriguez 
(.supra note 4), that the Charter has established the essentially secular nature of Canadian society and 
therefore ensures a central place for freedom of conscience in public institutions. The dichotomy 
between secular as conscience enhancing and non-secular as conscience undermining is, in Benson’s 
view, both unsupported and counterintuitive.
31 David M. Brown, “Freedom from or Freedom for?: Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content 
of Charter Rights” (2000) 33 U.B.C.L. Rev. 551 at 563.
32 Excerpted in Klassen, supra note 23 at 94.
33 Ibid. at 95.
distance the Charter, and s. 7 specifically, from the substantive due process 
jurisprudence of the US (which led to, among other maelstroms, Roe v. Wade).34 
Faced with an ambiguous term, the Supreme Court of Canada gave the legislative 
history of the Charter a vote but not a veto over the content of “fundamental 
justice”. In Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,35 the Court affirmed that, notwithstanding 
the intent of the drafters as expressed in Parliamentary debates and other records of 
the time, the principles of fundamental justice indeed contained a substantive as well 
as procedural content. In Suresh v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and 
Immigration), the Court held that this content is informed not just by the “basic 
tenets of our legal system” but also by international law.36 Just as the principles of 
fundamental justice could be read as a repository for the tenets of our legal system, 
so I contend the supremacy of God should be read as a repository for the tenets of 
our moral system and commitments to social justice (notwithstanding that the 
drafters’ intent for this clause in the Preamble may have been something quite 
different).
In light of this alternative view of the Preamble’s effect, it is clearly necessary 
to move beyond religious sectarianism in order to understand God as a constitutional 
paradigm. It is to a brief sketch of the contours of such a paradigm, and the proper 
place of human dignity within it, that I now turn by way of conclusion.
V. Dignifiying the Charter by Constitutionalizing God
I have suggested that there is a larger role for the supremacy of God in the Preamble 
to the Charter that has nothing whatever to do with religious convictions or 
particular religious traditions but, rather with universal aspirations to moral good 
and social justice. No one religious or secular or political or judicial leader has 
unique or superior insight into the meaning or mandate of God; rather, this term’s 
incorporation in the Charter should be seen as an invitation to contest and engage 
in dialogue about the normative foundations of Charter rights, and first among these 
foundations is the content of human dignity. In short, claims on the scope and 
content of human dignity are leaps of faith, not in the name of a supernatural deity, 
but rather in the name of our own collective moral aspirations.
This is not to say that spirituality and religious conviction are irrelevant to the 
enterprise of constitutional interpretation. Interpretations of human dignity may, and 
in my view, should include perspectives derived from religious literatures. My own 
interest has been in the development of human dignity as a legal norm in Jewish 
law,37 but it may just as easily flow from the cosmological implications of
34 A. Gold, “The Legal Rights Provision: A New Vision or Deja Vu?” ( 1982) 4 Supreme Court L. R. 107 
at 110-11.
35 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 16.
36 2002 SCC 1 at paras. 45-47.
37 See, for example, N. Rakover, Human Dignity in Jewish Law (Jerusalem: The Library of Jewish Law - 
Ministry of Justice - The Jewish Legal Heritage Society, 1998).
aboriginal justice, the philosophies of Kant or Levinas, or the revelations of artists, 
physicists or mathematicians. To do justice to the Preamble’s “call to faith”, all must 
agree only that a set of justifiable, moral convictions must reside alongside the rule 
of law and animate the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. David Brown 
attempted to capture this distinction between the positive and normative dimensions 
of the Preamble in the following terms:
Now the Charter is very much the product o f positive law; but, in addition to setting 
out some political principles particular to Canadian government, the Charter 
purports to articulate certain universal principles and import them into Canadian law 
-  freedom o f religion, equality before the law, etc. By pointing to certain universal 
freedoms which positive law is required to protect, the C harter  (intentionally or 
unwittingly) draws on sources which lie outside o f positive law. Part o f the task 
which Canadian courts must undertake when interpreting the content o f those 
universal freedoms is to explore and understand the principles which flow from 
those other sources. Theology and philosophy are those other sources; faith and 
reason are the methods by which their principles are discerned. Looked at in this 
way, “the supremacy o f God” and “the rule o f  law” are the principles upon which 
Canada is founded, and the Pream ble demarks the po in t fro m  which courts must 
depart in their efforts to interpret and apply the general principles o f  the Charter 
to the particu lar acts o f  Canadian governments. The Pream ble challenges courts to 
engage in the po litica lly  necessary analysis o f  the relationship between the 
transcendental and the tem poral in dem ocratic life.38
The supremacy of God, in other words, is what infuses the Charter's provisions, 
its “supreme” laws, with a claim to social justice and a foundation of moral 
legitimacy. It is from this aspirational quality of Charter interpretation, I would 
suggest, that the primacy of human dignity derives. This connection is not unknown 
to Charter jurisprudence. For example, in R. v. Beared  Chief Justice Bayda for the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal elaborated the concept of human dignity with 
reference to the supremacy of God as set out in the Preamble.
It would be incongruous if  a Charter which expressly recognizes the supremacy o f 
God (in the preamble) and impliedly (no less than the Canadian Bill o f Rights, 
R.S.C. 1970, App. Ill, expressly in its preamble) the dignity and worth o f the human 
person were to shield a person from the loss o f a finger but not from the loss o f  his 
self respect. (I note that the inherent dignity o f a person has at least two aspects: 
first, that threshold level o f dignity and worth which defines humanness and which 
is the birthright o f  every individual regardless o f societal perceptions o f human 
worth and regardless o f  individual perceptions o f self-worth; second, that dignity 
and self-worth that an individual derives from his own sense o f  self-respect).
38 Supra note 30 at 563 [emphasis added].
39 56 Sask. R. 173 (C.A.).
40 Ibid. at 181.
Of course, such judicial experimentations with the possible meaning of the 
Preamble have been the exception and not the rule. To return to the problem posed 
at the outset, how would the Court’s elaboration of human dignity as a constitutional 
norm differ if it were primarily rooted in the supremacy of God as a normative 
framework? For one thing, I believe dignity could no longer be understood solely 
as individual autonomy, but also as social interdependency. In Gosselin, such a view 
would tend to cast suspicion on the majority judgment of Chief Justice McLachlin, 
discussed above.
More kindred with the perspective on human dignity advanced through the lens 
of the supremacy of God is the vigorous dissent Justice Arbour offered in Gosselin 
(although, unsurprisingly, no reference to the Preamble is found in her reasons). She 
focused on the right to life contained in s. 7 as a necessary prerequisite to all other 
Charter rights and concluded:
One should not readily accept that the right to life in s. 7 means virtually nothing.
T o begin with, this result violates basic standards o f interpretation by suggesting that 
the Charter speaks essentially in vain in respect o f this fundamental right. More 
importantly, however, it threatens to undermine the coherence and purpose o f the 
Charter as a whole. After all, the right to life is a prerequisite -  a sine qua non -  
for the very possibility o f enjoying all the other rights guaranteed by the Charter.
To say this is not to set up a hierarchy o f Charter rights. No doubt a meaningful 
right to life is reciprocally conditioned by these other rights: they guarantee that 
human life has dignity, worth and meaning. Nevertheless, the centrality o f the right 
to life to the Charter as a whole is obvious. Indeed, it would be anomalous if, while 
guaranteeing a complex o f rights and freedoms deemed to be necessary to human 
fulfilment within society, the Charter had nothing o f significance to say about the 
one right that is indispensable for the enjoyment o f all o f these others.4
As a further and related example of this different approach to human dignity, 
consider the case of Kimberley Rogers, the Ontario welfare recipient who, while in 
the third trimester of a pregnancy, was sentenced to house arrest for fraud because 
she had received student loans and failed to disclose these amounts to the welfare 
authorities. Rogers’ case gained notoriety because she died while confined to her 
apartment of an apparent overdose of medications. Rogers succeeded in obtaining 
a constitutional exemption from the effect of a ban on receiving welfare which 
would have left her confined to her apartment with no source of income whatsoever. 
In granting this exemption, Justice Epstein offered the following rationale based on 
a social notion of human dignity:
[i]f the applicant is exposed to the full three-month suspension o f her benefits, a 
member o f  our community carrying an unborn child may well be homeless and 
deprived o f  basic sustenance. Such a situation would jeopardize the health o f Ms. 
Rogers and the fetus, thereby adversely affecting not only mother and child but also 
the public -  its dignity, its human rights commitments and its health care resources.
For many reasons, there is overwhelming public interest in protecting a pregnant 
woman in our community from being destitute.42
The implications of this approach to human dignity are far reaching. If our 
collective dignity is undermined by members of our community being “deprived of 
basic sustenance” by the failure of the state to provide sufficient support through 
welfare benefits, then the Charter may require of the state proactive obligations to 
care for its most vulnerable citizens. As Oscar Schachter has asserted,
[f]ew will dispute that a person in abject condition, deprived o f adequate means o f 
subsistence, or denied the opportunity to work, suffers s profound affront to his 
sense o f  dignity and intrinsic worth. Economic and social arrangments can not 
therefore be excluded from a consideration o f the demands o f dignity. At the least, 
it requires recognisiton o f  a  minimal concept o f distributive justice that would 
require satisfaction o f  the essential needs o f everyone.43
What could justify this judicial intrusion into the sovereignty of Parliament to decide 
how it wishes to allocate resources? The answer likely would not be the rule of law, 
which restrains government action rather than compelling it. In my view, the 
supremacy of God provides a basis for subsuming the will of Parliament to certain, 
higher constitutional obligations -  obligations of the kind Epstein alludes to in 
Rogers, and Justice Arbour emphasizes in Gosselin. While recourse to the Preamble 
and the supremacy of God is not necessary to achieve this interpretation of s. 7 or 
of the Charter generally, it serves to focus the debate on the universal aspirations 
contained in the concept of human dignity. It provides the moral architecture of the 
Charter with a series of possible blueprints.
Finally, while I have strong convictions about the relationship between the 
“supremacy of God”, human dignity and the obligations which ought to be imposed 
on the state by virtue of the Charter, it is important to reiterate that such interpretive 
conclusions always will remain a leap of faith. The blueprint is not complete and 
waiting to be uncovered -  rather, it is a collaborative work in progress. My 
advocacy for a rejuvenated role for the supremacy of God in constitutional 
jurisprudence does not depend on a court adopting my own version of its content -  
rather, my position depends on courts acknowledging that all interpretive 
conclusions regarding the content and meaning of the Charter embody moral claims 
which, to be accepted, must derive from conviction and be susceptible to 
justification. While personal, spiritual convictions may rest on faith alone, 
constitutional principles require justification and can only be sustained, in the long 
run, by social consensus. A leap of faith regarding the moral content of human 
dignity requires reasons. The leap of faith which I find most compelling, for 
example, is that human dignity as a Charter norm ought to encompass and elaborate 
the claim that all human beings merit equal moral worth and recognition by the
42 Rogers v. Sudbury (Administrator o f  Ontario Works) (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 460 at para. 19.
43 Supra note 2 at 851.
state, and that this imposes positive obligations on governments to meet the basic 
needs of those dependant on state assistance (whether this conviction springs from 
secular or spiritual sources seems to me to be beside the point). What the Supreme 
Court of Canada has failed to do, in my view, is precisely this -  subject its faith in, 
and claims regarding, the content of human dignity to the test of reason and 
justification. What I have suggested in this essay is that until the Court does so, the 
purposes of human dignity will remain unrevealed, and the edifice of the Charter 
will remain a façade.
